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doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.11.046hypothesis about distinctive etiologic processes that
might underlie observed disparities, such as genetic pre-
dispositions (Cooper, 2004). These two main currents in
disparities research are often pitted against one another
as opposing paradigms, and they have indisputable
political implications that affect the way in which re-
search is conducted, interpreted and debated. For exam-
ple, some political conservatives have decried research
emphasis on differential treatment, arguing that it de-
tracts attention from the individual health behaviors
and innate predispositions that contribute importantly
to observed disparities (Satel, 2001; Satel & Klick,
2005). In contrast, other researchers have argued that
the observed social disparities in health are a necessary
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ideologies at the societal level (Levins, 2000; Navarro
& Shi, 2001), and have asserted that excessive attention
to individual factors such as genetics and behaviors is
a distraction motivated by ideological rather than
scientific justifications (Goodman, 2000).
Despite the voluminous and contentious debate on
this question of the balance between individual and
social factors in the etiology of racial/ethnic health
disparities, one important consideration that has been
largely ignored is that the statistical justification for
these two types of inferences is fundamentally distinct.
Although data are collected, analyzed and interpreted in
relation to both of these general hypotheses, the basis
for statistical inference and causal attribution differs
in significant ways. This difference can be most readily
demonstrated by noting that the hypothesis of social
discrimination is one in which the causal process under
study is in the mind of the physician (or other decision-
maker), in response to some acute stimulus, such as the
presentation of a patient whose race is observed. The
hypothesis of individual predilection or predisposition,
on the other hand, places the causal process within the
physiology or psychology of the affected individual.
In this case, the individual experiences a behavior or
physiologic state because of who they are, a condition
that is chronic and fundamentally inalterable.
There are numerous ramifications of this conceptual
distinction between the two causal hypotheses, but one
notable example is that it is possible to design experi-
mental trials to study discrimination directly, whereas
it is not possible to design an experimental study that
directly assesses innate predilection or predisposition.
Scientists can certainly learn about mechanisms at the
level of individual physiology and how these contribute
to population-level health disparities, but the process is
necessarily inductive. For example, an understanding of
the role of hemoglobin S in the etiology of malaria helps
to explain population-level disparities in the incidence
of sickle-cell anemia between people of West African
ancestry in contrast to people of Northern European
ancestry. This knowledge did not (and could not) arise
from statistical inference in population studies of risk
factors and disease, however, but rather from physiolog-
ical studies and inferences from evolutionary theory
(Fix, 2003).
In this article, I review the foundation of causal
inference in etiologic epidemiology as it is applied to
studies of racial/ethnic health disparities. I will describe
normative applications of quantitative techniques for
causal inference as they are practiced in research on
discrimination in health care and also for research oninnate predisposition. I will then show why the latter
is an injudicious application of this statistical methodol-
ogy, and I will illustrate this point with the example of
an influential study in the biomedical literature that
purported to demonstrate a lesser response to angioten-
sin-converting enzyme inhibitor therapy in black as
compared with white patients with left ventricular
dysfunction (Exner, Dries, Domanski, & Cohn, 2001).What epidemiologists do?
Causal inference is fundamentally related to experi-
mentation, which is why the randomized controlled trial
(RCT) is widely considered to be the ‘‘gold standard’’
for establishment of causality in biomedicine. In an
experimental design such as an RCT, the treatment of
interest is assigned or withheld without regard to any
measured or unmeasured characteristic of the individ-
ual. Therefore, the cumulative experiences of the two
groups at the end of the study cannot logically result
from any systematic differences in covariate distribu-
tions (Rubin, 1974). It is the absence of the alternative
explanation of an unmeasured common cause that
makes a properly conducted RCT such a compelling
argument for a causal effect of treatment expressed in
counterfactual terms. That is, the treated and untreated
groups can each serve as valid substitute populations for
the other’s unobserved (counterfactual) experiences,
and an effect measure formed by the contrast between
the groups is an unbiased estimate of the true unobserv-
able causal contrast between treated and untreated
summary values for the target population of interest
(Maldonado & Greenland, 2002).
In observational studies, in contrast with RCTs, there
may exist any number of measured or unmeasured
quantities (Z) that are associated with (but not affected
by) a point-exposure of interest (X) and causally pre-
cede the outcome (Y). In general, such variables will
act to confound the observed relation, meaning that
the observed association in the data would not converge
to the true causal effect as the sample size becomes
infinite (Greenland, Robins, & Pearl, 1999). The true
causal effect is the one that would be achieved from
an experimental manipulation of X. Formally, if
actually forcing X to some specific value x1 would result
in a different probability distribution of Y than if we had
forced X to some alternate value x2, we say that X has
a causal effect on Y, and, furthermore, that the magni-
tude of this causal effect can be described as some
contrast of these values, such as a difference or a ratio.
Pearl (2000) developed succinct notation that expresses
1661J.S. Kaufman / Social Science & Medicine 66 (2008) 1659e1669such an effect without specifying the form of contrast or
the levels to which X is fixed:
PrðY ¼ yjSET½X ¼ xÞ ð1Þ
This notation then allows us to express confounding as
the divergence between any such contrast in experimen-
tally manipulated data and the same contrast in
passively observed data:
PrðY ¼ yjSET½X ¼ xÞsPrðY ¼ yjX ¼ xÞ ð2Þ
If confounding can be attributed entirely to covariate(s)
Z, then adjustment, for example via standardization,
allows for the unbiased estimation of the true causal
effect:
PrðY ¼ yjSET½X ¼ xÞ
¼
X
z
½PrðY ¼ yjX ¼ x;Z ¼ zÞPrðZ ¼ zÞ ð3Þ
where summation is over observed values Z¼ z, and Z
is unaffected by X (Rosenbaum, 1984).
This is the basic theoretical foundation of statistical
adjustment for observational data, and motivates the
approach to all etiologic (as opposed to purely descrip-
tive) analyses. The appeal to experimental manipulation
for a definition of confounding is essential in order to tie
the results back to the real world in some way. That is,
the observed data are already a description of the world
as it exists factually. Statistical adjustment creates a new
set of numbers which do not pertain to the factual world,
and therefore one must ask: to what world do they per-
tain? The answer is that they describe distributions of
outcome Y under hypothetical manipulations of the ex-
posure, letting all other quantities run their natural
course (Greenland, 2005).The experimental model applied to
disparities arising from discrimination
Applying the analytic epidemiologic model
described above to health disparities arising from differ-
ential treatment is straightforward because the
experimental intervention is well-defined. Consider
a patient’s socially recognized racial identity in relation
to some medical diagnosis, evaluation or procedure,
such as referral for right-heart catheterization
(Schulman et al., 1999). What we want to know is
whether the causal process to refer or not refer, which
takes place in the physician’s mind, is affected (con-
sciously or unconsciously) by the patient’s race. In the
conduct of an experiment, we can hold all other factorsconstant. That is, we can present a decision-maker with
two patients who are identical in all relevant respects
except for the one characteristic of interest. If the phys-
ician’s decision is consistently associated with patient’s
race over a large number of such matched pairs in this
experimental design, then the only plausible interpreta-
tion is that the decision-maker is using race in order to
decide how to act. If there is no good evidence base for
considering race in this way, then the decision-making
process is discriminatory in the pejorative sense of the
word.
A large number of experimental trials with this basic
design has been conducted over the years in order to
document the role that patient demographics play in
clinical decision-making. For example, Loring and
Powell (1988) constructed two psychiatric case presen-
tations that were intended to represent undifferentiated
schizophrenia, and these were randomly assigned to be
from one of five categories, consisting of each of four
race/sex combinations (black/white and male/female)
and a fifth group lacking any demographic information.
These profiles were then assigned a diagnosis by 290
psychiatrists who returned questionnaires through the
mail. Even though the case vignettes were identical ex-
cept for the demographic information, the proportions
of various diagnoses varied substantially by randomly
assigned sex and race of the hypothetical patients. For
example, black patients, especially black men, were
much more likely to be assigned the diagnosis of para-
noid schizophrenia, indicating that clinicians perceived
in these descriptions greater degrees of violence,
suspiciousness and dangerousness than for the identical
white patients. Furthermore, of 19 respondents who said
that insufficient information was available to form
a judgment, 12 had vignettes for which race and gender
had not been provided.
Many other experimental trials of this basic design
have been conducted over the years to demonstrate
the causal role of race in decision-making in a variety
of settings, usually in situations in which there is
general agreement that conditioning the decision on
race has no rational justification. For example, Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004) sent fictitious resumes to help-
wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers, ran-
domly assigning African-American- or white-sounding
names to the otherwise identical applications. In this
study, white names received 50% more callbacks for
interviews. What these experimental studies have in
common is the assurance that there are no variables,
measured or unmeasured, that are correlated with the
exposure (race) and independently predictive of the
outcome. The patients or job applicants can have no
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They are represented only by a written case presentation
or job application that is known to be invariant. Any
perceived differences in the outcome distribution, there-
fore, are attributable to the decision-makers’ imposition
of racial stereotypes or prejudices onto the imaginary
study subjects, which is exactly the effect that one
wishes to isolate and quantify.The analytic epidemiologic model applied
to disparities arising from discrimination
In the experimental designs described above, the
causal effect of interest is readily defined:
PrðY ¼ yjSET½Race¼ rÞ ð4Þ
and the ‘‘setting’’ action is literal, because the case vi-
gnettes or job applications are physically manipulated.
With this model in mind, however, it is easy to extend
the same logic to observational studies in which no
actual manipulation is achieved, but for which statisti-
cal manipulation of the observed data is relied upon
as a method for estimating what would happen in an
experimental scenario. If there are covariates Z that
are associated with (but not affected by) race and which
are independently predictive of the outcome, these must
be measured and adjusted for in order to have confi-
dence that the association measure in the study has
a causal interpretation. Specifically, this causal interpre-
tation is the outcome distribution contrast that would be
observed under a randomization of race to the case
presentations, rather than contrasting individuals based
on their observed races.
For example, Todd, Deaton, D’Adamo, and Goe
(2000) sought to determine the causal effect of patient
race on receipt of analgesics for extremity fractures in
hospital emergency rooms. The authors reviewed re-
cords from an urban emergency department in Atlanta,
selecting for study all black and white patients present-
ing with new, isolated long-bone fractures over a multi-
year study period. They collected all available medical
and demographic information on these patients along
with their recorded level of analgesic administration,
and used regression modeling to adjust simultaneously
for these multiple covariates that are potentially associ-
ated with race and are predictive of treatment. For
example, if black patients were more likely to be
female, and if females generally receive more analgesia,
then sex would be a potential confounder of the causal ef-
fect of interest. In this case, the authors found that after
adjustment for all relevant measured covariates, whitepatients were significantly more likely than black patients
to receive analgesics, despite similar records of pain com-
plaints in the medical record. The risk of receiving no
analgesic at all was 66% greater for black patients than
for white patients, an effect that could not be explained
by any confounding factor known to the investigators.
A less secure basis for causal inference in the
observational study of discrimination, in contrast to the
experimental designs described above, arises because it
is always possible that there is some variable which is
known to the decision-maker but not to the analyst, and
which creates a spurious association between race and
outcome. For example, if black patients in the Todd
et al. study were more likely to have some legitimate
counter-indication for analgesia that was not recorded
in the medical record, then it would appear to the analyst
that emergency room physicians were acting irrationally,
when in fact their actions were justifiably motivated by
this hidden variable. This is the ‘‘fundamental problem
of causal inference’’ that plagues all observational re-
search (Holland, 1986), and the only general solution is
to have sufficient subject-matter knowledge and suffi-
ciently good data that one can have confidence that no
confounder of any importance remains unmeasured.
Heckman (1998) notes that even if all relevant cova-
riates are measured, other modeling improprieties, such
as incorrect specification of the model form, can lead to
bias in causal estimation. Furthermore, if the decision is
based in part on an unmeasured characteristic, and if it
is obtained by exceeding some critical threshold value,
then changes in the distribution of the unmeasured
characteristic can also lead to observed inequality in
the outcome even in the absence of discrimination.
This argument was in fact made recently by former Har-
vard University President Lawrence Summers in his
famously controversial speech about gender inequality
in science and engineering (Fogg, 2005). For example,
consider a hypothetical study of gender discrimination
in tenure decisions for women scientists at Harvard.
Suppose that some unmeasured aspect of mathematical
ability has the same mean value in men and in women,
but a larger variance in men. If the tenure decision rests
on some absolute threshold of ability, then the longer
right-tail of the distribution of this unmeasured trait in
men will give men a higher probability of exceeding
this value, even when there is no discrimination.
The analytic epidemiologic model applied
to disparities arising from innate factors
Many investigators wish to evaluate hypotheses of
racial disparity that arise from intrinsic factors,
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differences in innate abilities such as intelligence
(Rowe, 2005) or athletic prowess (Marks, 2000). The
dilemma that arises is that application of the usual
epidemiologic analysis rests, as it did in the previous
examples, on the direct analogy of the RCT. What we
hope to achieve in an analysis of observational data is
the effect estimate that we would have been able to ob-
serve in the (hypothetical) RCT that we did not conduct.
But the obvious problem is that this (hypothetical) RCT
is no longer so readily definable for intrinsic factors
(Kaufman & Cooper, 1999). The problem is definitional
because the no-confounding criterion in Eq. (2) above is
expressed in terms of the physical randomization of the
study subjects, even if this manipulation is hypothetical.
For intrinsic factors, however, the model loses any
semblance of interpretability.
This limitation of observational epidemiology has
been noted previously (Holland, 1986; Holland, 2001;
Kaufman & Cooper, 1999; Zuberi, 2001), but even if
one grants such a definition, there is still the practical
problem of adjusting for a potentially impossible
number of covariates. What finite set of measurable
quantities can we adjust for in Eq. (3) to make the
treated and untreated groups (e.g., blacks and whites)
each serve as valid substitute populations for the other’s
unobserved (counterfactual) experiences (Maldonado
&Greenland, 2002)? Given the pervasive social distinc-
tion made between racial/ethnic groups in racially
stratified societies, it seems implausible to suggest
that within some definable cross-classifications of cova-
riates, blacks and white might be considered to be
exchangeable in all respects except for the exposure
(Kaufman, Cooper, & McGee, 1997).
If the basis for causal inference is subverted for non-
manipulable (i.e., intrinsic) factors, then how can we
speak colloquially about health disparities arising
from differential distributions of biologic traits? For
example, the age-adjusted 2001 incidence of melanoma
in black men in the United States was 1.1/100,000,
whereas for white men the incidence was 21.5/
100,000, or 20-fold higher (U.S. Cancer Statistics
Working Group, 2004). Most people would be comfort-
able attributing this disparity almost entirely to
differences in average skin color between these popula-
tions, even though this is a trait that is immutable, and
for which no randomized intervention is readily
conceivable. Furthermore, we might even speak of
a counterfactual in which we imagine what would be
the incidence in populations of African origin if they
were to have light skin, all other factors being equal,
and most people would take a number close to 21.5/100,000 as a reasonable estimate for this counterfactual.
Or to take a somewhat less obvious example, consider
the F508 mutation in the CFTR gene, a trait that in
homozygotes leads to an inability to transport salt in
cells of the lungs called cystic fibrosis (Rowe, Miller,
& Sorscher, 2005). US whites have a population
prevalence of this mutation of about 1/2800 individuals,
whereas for US blacks the mutation occurs in only
about 1/35,000 individuals (Phillips, Bishop, Woods,
& Elias, 1995). This variant appears to be sufficient
(although not necessary) for the development of the
cystic fibrosis phenotype, and therefore it seems
entirely reasonable to attribute much of the observed
racial disparity to differential distribution of this trait
at the population level.
What the skin cancer and cystic fibrosis examples
demonstrate is that we can make inductive arguments
about intrinsic traits as causes of disparities so long as
we can assume plausibly that environmental factors
are distributed more or less equivalently between the
two groups (e.g., ultra-violet radiation and skin cancer
in the United States) or that environmental factors are
essentially irrelevant (e.g., F508 mutation and cystic
fibrosis). In this situation, no covariate adjustment (ex-
cept perhaps age) is necessary, and the causal inference
model represented by Eq. (3) can be expressed simply
as:
PrðY ¼ yjRace¼ rÞ ð5Þ
This is because subject-matter knowledge assures that
there are no factors that are both strongly correlated
with race and highly independently predictive of the
outcome, and therefore no ‘‘setting’’ (i.e., physical
manipulation) of the exposure is necessary. If we were
to consider cystic fibrosis mortality as opposed to inci-
dence, however, then this prima facie no-confounding
assumption would no longer be tenable, because
socioeconomic and other factors that are associated
with race can clearly contribute to disease severity
and medical care, which in turn affect mortality
(Britton, 1989; O’Connor et al., 2002).
For racial disparities in common multi-factorial
disorders such as cardiovascular disease and common
cancers, the inductive inferential process exemplified
by the cystic fibrosis incidence example does not
readily apply. If there is any single sufficient cause for
diseases such as diabetes or hypertension, it remains
unknown, and most researchers believe that a large
number of genetic and environmental factors contribute
interactively to risk, each with a relatively small effect.
Differential prevalence of some candidate gene would
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prevalence of disease phenotype, since multiple path-
ways can lead to the same observed disease endpoint.
Moreover, we know that contrasting social and eco-
nomic environments lead to wide variations in pheno-
type even for groups with common ancestry, such as
the comparison of diabetes and hypertension risk across
the diverse social environments of the West African
Diaspora (Cooper et al., 1997). When aspects of the
physical or social environment affect disease risk, and
when these are correlated with race, then the effect of
race will be confounded, and this confounding cannot
be eliminated for both definitional and practical
reasons. The definitional reason is that the criteria for
no-confounding (Eq. (2)) involves a model of physical
manipulation of the exposure that has no interpretability
when race is the exposure. The practical reason is that in
a racially stratified society, in which race is correlated
with virtually all cultural traits, social interactions and
economic options, the dimensionality of covariate vec-
tor Z in Eq. (3) is impossibly large. That is, one could
never hope to measure sufficiently many characteristics
of study subjects to make the two groups exchangeable
(i.e., valid substitute populations for the others’ average
counterfactual outcome experiences).
The conclusion regarding the epidemiologic
approach to observational data on racial health dispar-
ities seems unambiguous. When the investigator’s
causal hypothesis involves unjustified discrimination
on the part of a decision-maker, then the statistical ap-
proach to causal inference is generally defensible. The
exposure effect can be theoretically randomized, which
provides a meaningful standard of what it would mean
for the effect to be unconfounded. Furthermore, when
the data are observed rather than experimental, so that
adjustment for covariates is necessary, the universe of
potentially confounding variables is often tractable.
This is because the causal process involves the deliber-
ations of a decision-maker, and so the factors that
impinge upon this process can themselves be studied
and enumerated. On the other hand, when the investiga-
tor’s causal hypothesis involves an innate characteristic
of the study subject, such as genetics, physiology or
psychology, then the statistical approach to causal infer-
ence on the basis of multivariate adjustment is difficult
to justify. There is no meaning to the randomization
model in Eq. (1), and therefore the no-confounding
criterion in Eq. (2) remains undefined. Furthermore,
since there is no hope in the foreseeable future of know-
ing all of the social and environmental mechanisms that
affect risk of chronic diseases such as hypertension and
diabetes, and since racism creates imbalances in anessentially infinite set of social and material factors,
no adjustment is plausibly adequate. In common
practice, measured adjustment sets are generally so lim-
ited that the assertion of causal inference in this context
cannot be considered credible.
An example of the analytic epidemiologic
model applied to innate factors
In 2001, the New England Journal of Medicine pub-
lished an article by Canadian cardiologist Derek Exner,
who had collaborated with Jay Cohn of the University
of Minnesota to re-analyze the combined arms of the
‘‘Studies of Left Ventricular Dysfunction’’ (SOLVD)
trials (Exner et al., 2001). This secondary analysis com-
pared the efficacy of the angiotensin-converting
enzyme (ACE) inhibitor enalapril with placebo in black
and white heart failure patients. Exner et al. concluded
that current therapeutic recommendations apply to
white patients but not necessarily to black patients,
and therefore that future therapeutic recommendations
should be tailored according to racial background.
This article has proven quite influential, having been
cited nearly 200 times in the peer-reviewed literature as
of the end of 2006, as documented by Journal Citation
Reports (JCR), a database published by the Institute for
Scientific Information (ISI). Specifically, the article has
been cited heavily by proponents of race-specific thera-
pies, as evidence of differential response due to innate
differences in physiology of disease between blacks
and whites (e.g., Cohn, 2002; Cohn, Loscalzo, &
Franciosa, 2003). Moreover, this article has been cited
in treatment guidelines as justification for discouraging
use of ACE inhibitors in black patients (e.g., Khan et al.,
2004). It was also cited by the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to justify the new policy that
clinical trial data must be reported by participants’
race (Haga & Venter, 2003).
Given this substantial impact, it is reasonable to
question whether the logic of the analytic exercise con-
ducted in the Exner et al. article is valid in relation to the
critique discussed above. The authors stress the random-
ized design of the SOLVD trials, as though this would
confer to them some advantage in obtaining the desired
inference. But this appeal to randomization is either
misguided or disingenuous, since the focus of the
analyses in this article is not on the average treatment
effect of enalapril (i.e., the focus is not on the factor
that was randomized), but rather on the effect measure
modification of this average treatment effect by another
variable, race, which was not randomly assigned.
Furthermore, there is much prior information available
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disease are not well balanced between the racial groups.
The authors began their report by noting that a previ-
ously published analysis of the same SOLVD data
showed a smaller estimated treatment effect in black
than in white patients for two outcomes (death from
any cause or hospitalization for heart failure), but that
this differential treatment effect did not attain statistical
significance after adjustment for measured covariates
(p¼ 0.08) (Dries et al., 1999). The authors, therefore,
set out to match each of the black subjects with up to
four white subjects on several measured factors: enroll-
ment in either the prevention or the treatment trial, ejec-
tion fraction, assigned therapy (enalapril or placebo),
sex, and age in three broad groupings. The authors
claimed that this matching strategy would increase their
statistical power for the comparison of treatment effects
by race, but this assertion is in fact questionable because
race was not randomized (Greenland & Morgenstern,
1990). In cohort studies, matching is primarily indi-
cated in order to reduce costs in the collection of data.
Once the data are already collected, however, one can’t
generally do better by throwing away a large proportion
of these data, as the SOLVD analysts did in this paper.
This matching strategy could be justified if the authors
suspected effect measure heterogeneity, because in this
case the additional white subjects would be ‘‘off the
support’’ for the causal comparison of interest (Manski,
1993). In this case, however, the results would be
generalizable only to the range of values represented
by the matching regime (e.g., ejection fractions at
which both black and white subjects were observed).
The authors made no such restriction in their interpreta-
tion, however.
A total of 6797 participants met the inclusion criteria
for the study, 4228 from the prevention trial and 2569
from the treatment trial. Of these, 800 categorized
themselves as black. Another 5719 participants catego-
rized themselves as white and thus were eligible to be
matched with one of the black participants. Of the
5719 white participants, 1196 (21%) were matched
with the black patients; the remaining 79% of white
patients were discarded. For 579 (72%) of the black
participants there was only a single white match, and
for 14 black participants (2%), no suitable white match
was found.
Patients were randomly assigned to receive up to
20 mg of enalapril or placebo daily, a dosage that could
be modified by individual physicians who naturally
were not blinded to the patient’s race. The analysts
collected a number of covariates, including medical
care factors such as other drug therapy prescriptions,and social factors such as the presence of financial
distress during the 12 months before enrollment and
the highest level of education attained. The primary
outcome measures were deaths from any cause and
hospitalization for heart failure.
Compared to matched white patients, black patients
were in general younger, had higher mean blood
pressure, more exposure to recent financial distress,
and lower average attained educational level. They
were also much less likely to be using aspirin, beta-
blockers, or anti-arrhythmics. In light of substantial
differences in other dimensions of health and well-
being that exist in the wider society, there is no doubt
that many other unmeasured variables also differed
substantially between the two groups. The matching
procedure used by the authors reduced, but did not
eliminate, differences in means for observed variables.
For example, the relative probability of taking aspirin
comparing white to black patients was reduced from
1.88 overall to 1.73 in the matched participants. It is
therefore certain that substantial differences remained
between the matched participants in a host of other
unmeasured variables, not to mention residual con-
founding due to categorization of the measured
variables (Kaufman et al., 1997). For example, 37%
of black participants and 24% of matched white
participants reported experiencing financial distress
before entry into the study, but there is no basis to
believe that blacks and white experienced similar
levels of deprivation, stress or hardship within the
broadly defined category of financial distress.
An important observation is that the absolute risk
of the outcomes was higher for black than for
matched white participants. That is, even after match-
ing on ejection fraction and other factors, the black
group was sicker on average than the white group.
For example, 256 (33%) of the matched black partic-
ipants died, compared to 311 (26%) of the matched
white participants (relative risk¼ 1.25, 95% CI 1.09,
1.44). The discrepancy in baseline risk was even
more extreme in the case of the hospitalization, which
affected 238 matched black participants (30%) and
226 (19%) matched white participants (relative
risk¼ 1.60, 95% CI 1.37, 1.88). Nonetheless, the
authors ignored this discrepancy in baseline risk and
focused on the observation that there was an adjusted
49% reduction (95% CI 30%, 63%) in the risk of
heart failure hospitalization for the treated group of
matched white patients, whereas among the black
patients the adjusted risk reduction was only 14%,
and not significantly greater than 0 at the p< 0.05
criterion.
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logic literature that groups with higher baseline risk
will in general have more modest response to treatment
when ratio measures of effect are employed, as they
were in this analysis (Maldonado & Greenland, 2002).
This is because the counterfactual ratio that defines
that causal effect includes in both the numerator and
the denominator the proportion of the population that
would experience the outcome under either treatment
assignment. In this application, for instance, there is
some proportion of the participants p1 who will be hos-
pitalized for heart failure regardless of whether they re-
ceive enalapril or placebo, there is a proportion of the
participants p2 who will be hospitalized for heart failure
only if they receive placebo, and there is a remaining
proportion of the participants p3 who will not be hospi-
talized for heart failure regardless of which treatment
they receive. A treatment effect is the contrast between
the outcome proportion if the entire study cohort were
treated with placebo and the outcome proportion if
the entire study cohort were treated with enalapril.
This contrast may be constructed as the difference
measure [(p1þ p2) (p1)]¼ p2, which reflects the fact
that those participants susceptible to a treatment effect
are those in the p2 group only. A ratio measure of effect,
such as that used by these authors, however, takes the
contrast as [(p1þ p2)/p1], so that those doomed to be
hospitalized under either treatment are no longer can-
celled out of the treatment effect measure. For the ratio
contrast, an increase in the cohort proportion p1 neces-
sarily forces the measure closer to the null, even if the
susceptible population in the p2 group is held constant.
Returning to the Exner et al. analysis, it is clear that
a population group with higher baseline risk because
they are sicker can be characterized as having a larger
proportion p1. Knowing that the sicker black study
population has higher baseline risk of hospitalization
than for whites, therefore, it would be possible to predict
a priori that the ratio measure of treatment effect for this
groupwill be constrained to be closer to the null (White&
Elbourne, 2005). Membership in the p1 sub-population
simply represents hospitalization through some causal
mechanism that is not affected by enalapril. For example,
over half of all heart failure hospitalizations result from
excessive sodium retention that precipitates volume
overload (Bennett et al., 1998). Patientswith good educa-
tional and social support resources may successfully
avoid hospitalization by regular self-weighing and by
then adjusting diuretic dosages in response to fluctua-
tions (Smith, Fabbri, Pai, Ferry, & Heywood, 1997). If
the social support and patientephysician communication
factors that facilitate this successful self-management areunmeasured, as they are in the SOLVD data, then they
manifest as a reduced treatment effect simply by inflating
the proportion p1 in the cohort sub-population.
Exner et al. do remark in their discussion that ‘‘[i]t is
also possible that the findings may have resulted from
differences between the groups in compliance, diet,
medical follow-up, or access to care.’’ (p. 1356) None-
theless, they then go on to ignore these caveats and con-
clude that ‘‘the overall population of black patients with
heart failure may be underserved by current therapeutic
recommendations..[I]t seems appropriate to consider
current therapeutic recommendations as applying to
white patients but not necessarily to black patients.’’
The report ends with the suggestion that ‘‘therapeutic
recommendations may need to be tailored according
to racial background.’’ (p. 1357).
A critique of the Exner et al. article as an
example of the analytic epidemiologic
model applied to innate factors
The Exner et al. article highlights the inherent
problems of attempting statistical inferences about
innate factors in observational data. The analysis corre-
sponds to no randomized trial that could be described,
even hypothetically, because the causal inference
desired is the contrast between a treatment effect for
blacks and a treatment effect for whites under the prem-
ise that groups are balanced on all important causes of
the outcome. This premise motivated the crude match-
ing strategy, but the small number of factors matched
and the large number of strong unmeasured causes
makes this strategy dubious at best. The authors list
a few of the important unmeasured variables that pre-
sumably remained unbalanced between the two groups,
but the stated conclusions appear untempered by this
concern, and the article is widely cited as having dem-
onstrated a universally reduced capacity for therapeutic
response among blacks as if the assumption were satis-
fied. Conditioning on measured variables in the analy-
sis, in addition to matching, is a further attempt to
create exchangeability between the race groups. For ex-
ample, the authors adjusted for the binary variable rep-
resenting financial hardship, but the adjustment would
successfully remove the confounding bias due to this
variable only if blacks and whites who reported having
experienced financial hardship were equivalent with re-
spect to economic and social factors that might relate to
risk of hospitalization. Given the clear violation of this
assumption demonstrated in extant demographic data,
the equality represented in expression (3) above cannot
be considered credible, even as an approximation.
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often allow inductive arguments about intrinsic traits
as causes of disparities as long as we can assume
plausibly that environmental factors are distributed
more or less equivalently between the two groups.
In the Exner et al. example, however, this is not the
case, since psycho-social and economic factors are
known to be unbalanced and highly relevant for a so-
ciological outcome such as hospitalization. The larger
baseline difference for this outcome variable makes it
even clearer that unmeasured factors that differ
between blacks and whites in general are important
in determining the attained value. Nonetheless, even
though there were two primary outcomes defined,
and hospitalization was the weaker of the two (in
the sense that baseline risk was substantially higher
for blacks and assignment was made without the
decision-maker being blinded to patient race), the
null finding for mortality is largely ignored when
the paper is cited as evidence of differential treatment
efficacy. Furthermore, the null finding for the harder
endpoint of mortality has been replicated elsewhere
(Shekelle et al., 2003), and re-analysis of the SOLVD
data has shown that hospitalization is unique among
possible endpoints in demonstrating a treatment effect
differential (Dries, Strong, Cooper, & Drazner, 2002).
In summary, the analytic strategy pursued in the
Exner et al. paper provides very little insight into the
nature of the observed disparites. The authors’ etiologic
hypothesis is clearly stated as a physiologic difference
between blacks and whites, and yet the analytic epide-
miologic model applied to innate factors is dubious
for the reasons described above. In this specific applica-
tion, however, the situation is made even more tenuous
by the selection of an outcome for which risk in the
unexposed is the most discrepant of all defined
outcomes, and for which assignment is made subjec-
tively and without being blinded to patient race. These
problems are compounded by an unjustified matching
strategy that tosses out about 70% of the available
data. The result is a finding that has little inferential
value for either supporting or refuting the physiologic
hypothesis of interest. Moreover, the observational
analysis is designed to mimic a randomized trial that
cannot be defined in practical terms. Even allowing
that the motivating hypothetical trial remains indefin-
able, the alternate hypothesis that unmeasured determi-
nants of the outcome are imbalanced between the
groups is so likely, and so plausibly consequential,
that there is little credibility associated with the
assertion that the results of this analysis approximate
what would be obtained in the imaginary trial.The weak basis for inference in the Exner et al. paper
must be contrasted not only with its appearance as the
lead article in the most prestigious American medical
journal, but also with its considerable influence on the
field. It is over-interpreted not only as evidence that
‘‘black patients with chronic heart failure .derive
less benefit from angiotensin-converting enzyme
inhibitors, on average, then do whites’’ (Satel & Klick,
2005), but also to support the general notion that
‘‘.there is now growing evidence for genetic factors
being responsible for individual response to therapy.’’
(Hovind, Tarnow, Rossing, Carstensen, & Parving,
2004). Indeed, Bond et al. (2004) cite the article to
support the assertion ‘‘[R]acial differences in responses
to angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors are thought
to result from both genetic and environmental factors.’’
Recall that the Exner et al. article in fact involved no
analysis of genetic variants whatsoever, and yet this
rather surprising extrapolation is characteristic of
many of the citing articles. For example, in an article
on racial variation in the prevalence of atrial fibrillation
among heart failure patients, Ruo, Capra, Jensvold, and
Go (2004) cite Exner et al. to support the statement
‘‘Another possible explanation for the lower prevalence
of atrial fibrillation in African-Americans than in
Caucasians with heart failure may be intrinsic racial dif-
ferences in atrial membrane stability, atrial conduction
pathways, or genetic polymorphisms leading to differ-
ent susceptibility to the development of atrial fibrilla-
tion. For example, polymorphisms have been found to
be associated with racial differences in. response to
treatment for heart failure.’’ Moreover, the Exner
et al. article has also been interpreted as extending
this logic to other completely unrelated conditions.
Hughes, Moreland, and Bridges (2002), for example,
review genetic influences on rheumatoid arthritis in
blacks, noting that racial variation in therapeutic
response for this condition has never been observed.
Nonetheless, they cite the Exner et al. analysis as
evidence that such racial variation in treatment response
might reasonably be expected.
The application of statistical reasoning in epidemiol-
ogy has a clear foundation, rooted in the notion of
randomization that underlies all models, tests and
quantitative inferences (Greenland, 1990). Observa-
tional epidemiology makes use of this paradigm by
analogy, arguing that we may at times be able to mimic
the process of physical randomization that occurs in
trials through statistical adjustment. That is, conditional
on some measured factors, we can assert that no impor-
tant unmeasured determinants of the outcome remain
substantially unbalanced between treatment groups.
1668 J.S. Kaufman / Social Science & Medicine 66 (2008) 1659e1669This analogy has often proven quite useful, and has led
to insights of enormous public health importance over
the previous 50 years, such as the discovery of the
causal association between cigarettes smoking and
lung cancer. There are settings in which this analogy
does not hold, however, and these settings include the
attempt to discover innate physiological differences
between racial/ethnic groups. The discussion above
explains why analytic epidemiology can be used
sensibly and successfully to identify discrimination in
treatment as a cause of racial disparities in health, but
not for the identification of innate predispositions as
a cause of racial disparities in health. The article by
Exner et al. is an example of how such an analysis
can be largely unhelpful for evaluating the hypothesis
of interest, and in fact even potentially harmful. Despite
its questionable inferential validity, however, this article
has proven quite influential, and has been cited to
support a large number of claims about racial predispo-
sition to disease, many of which have very little to do
with the actual content of the article. This apparent
eagerness to embrace the message of racial essentialism
therefore seems to represent a very strong prior belief
on the part of many researchers. Until this strong predi-
lection for racial essentialism in biological thinking
abates, there would seem to be little hope that a more
sensible and honest approach to statistical inference in
observational data will take hold more widely.
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